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Aligning Financial Incentives (FIs) with policy goals is becoming increasingly popular in healthcare contexts (1,2). There are many factors which are likely to influence the way 
in which people respond to incentives. Whilst, there are a growing 
number of studies quantifying the impact of incentive schemes, 
many fail to explore how and why health impacts do or do not occur.
Much of the literature on FIs is derived from economic and 
psychological theory, which tends towards a view of atomistic 
individuals pursuing their own interests (3). Most of the social 
science literature examining how professionals engage with and are 
influenced by changes in incentive structures to date has tended 
to examine the impact of recent reforms drawing predominantly 
on economic (4) or sociological theory (5). Whilst, sociologically 
informed studies on the subject in relation to healthcare emphasise 
the importance of social and relational aspects such as shared norms, 
they tend to neglect the importance of the broader organisational 
context in which health professionals work. Linked to this, since the 
approach is often to ask ‘what has changed following new incentive 
structures?’ there is a danger that what has remained stable gets 
neglected (6). 
In economic and some health policy literatures, there has been a 
tendency to treat FIs as a ‘standard’ intervention, with researchers 
attempting to draw conclusions about the effectiveness of these 
in terms of improving quality in healthcare (7). However, such 
initiatives vary with respect to design and the social, cultural and 
historical context in which they are implemented. Despite these 
differences, they can all be conceived as attempting to exert control 
over health professionals and reconfigure the landscape in which 
they work. Research exploring the impacts of state-sponsored 
reforms in healthcare settings, more generally, is often concerned 
to identify and categorise processes and outcomes in terms of the 
control of professional work and related to this, assessing the extent 
to which reforms result in a diminution or retention of medical 
power (8). One of the problems with this type of approach is that it 
implicitly conceptualises power in terms of a zero-sum game, and 
linked to this, a control-resistance framework leaves little room to 
accommodate more nuanced responses to reforms (9).
A small number of recent studies add a useful perspective by 
drawing our attention to alternative ways of examining changes 
to incentive structures, which do not rely on focusing on the 
pursuit of individual or group interests in the context of a control/
resistance framework (6). They also remind us that since financial 
incentive regimes are not self-implementing, mechanisms to change 
behaviour (e.g. electronic medical records, bespoke software to 
guide doctors) are needed if change is to become institutionalised. 
In California, for example, the failure of FIs to produce anticipated 
benefits was due in part to the absence of electronic records. This 
meant that doctors’ performance was measured using claims/billing 
data. However, this resulted in the measurement of activities often 
undertaken outside of the practice—like for example, colonoscopy 
and mammogram rates—and less directly under the doctors’ 
control, therefore (10). Furthermore, many doctors in the California 
programme were unaware of or confused by targets and related 
payments. A combination of multiple payers and complex payment 
rules contributed to a situation in which doctors were often unaware 
of the content of targets. Although doctors in California received 
feedback from their medical group on their performance against 
quality targets, they had concerns about the accuracy of the data 
used to assess performance. These findings resonate with other 
recent studies, which highlight how clinicians are not necessarily 
resistant to quality goals, linked to financial rewards, but stress the 
importance of mechanisms to engage them (11,12). 
There is some limited evidence that FIs can improve health outcomes 
(13). The ‘Advancing Quality’ initiative, in the North West of  England 
was associated with a significant reduction in mortality. Yet, it was 
based on the Premier Hospital Quality Incentive Demonstration 
(PHQID) scheme in the US which had no impact on mortality (14). 
The design of the scheme, in terms of quality measures and formal 
rules was very similar in both countries, which suggests that the ways 
in which the schemes were implemented and the local contextual 
differences may explain differences in impacts. Whilst, the bonuses 
were larger in the English context, it seems likely that other factors 
also contributed to the relative success of the English initiative (13). 
This initiative is the subject of an ongoing in-depth evaluation, but 
the absence of detailed knowledge about the US variant makes 
drawing firm conclusions difficult. It also highlights the need for 
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studies to pay attention to issues beyond the formal scheme design.
A focus on formal rules, in particular the size of  the financial 
incentive, has been a preoccupation for some policy makers 
and academics (1). In the English NHS, the Commissioning for 
Quality and Innovation (CQUIN) Payment Framework linked 
organisational income to the achievement of quality improvement 
goals. In the first year of the scheme, the size of the incentive was 0.5% 
of the total contract income. This was increased to 1.5% after the first 
year and subsequently increased to 2.5%. The Chief Executive of the 
NHS Commissioning Board is on record as saying that he would like 
to see this increased to 5%.
A number of theories of cause and effect were contained within 
the CQUIN Impact Assessment prepared as part of the process 
of developing and implementing the CQUIN policy. CQUIN 
was intended to embed quality improvement and innovation 
through making the payment system reflect quality according to 
the Department of Health’s Impact Assessment (15). Although a 
nationally mandated scheme was considered within the Impact 
Assessment, a scheme which encompassed mainly local goals 
was seen as preferable since this would ensure that clinical staff in 
healthcare providers would get involved in developing schemes and 
build on local initiatives and enthusiasm using standard metrics 
(15). This emphasis on local goals and provider involvement appears 
to have been intended to get ownership from clinical teams, thereby 
increasing the likelihood that desired changes would be delivered. 
In practice, however, mechanisms to engage clinicians were 
largely absent. This suggests that rather than ramping up pressure 
by increasing the size of the incentive, efforts should be made to 
understand why anticipated benefits are not forthcoming. 
Whilst, it is important to learn from failure, there is some evidence 
that FIs can be successful in reducing inequalities in access to care 
(16). Incentive schemes can encourage a focus on aspects of care 
that are incentivised, but they can also ‘crowd out’ important issues, 
such as patient concerns (17). Furthermore, there is some evidence 
suggesting that rather than embedding improvements in care, FIs 
are associated with a diminution in performance once incentives are 
withdrawn (18). 
In summary, in theory at least, FIs offer the opportunity to align 
policy goals and professional behaviour. In practice, however, for the 
most part, the potential benefits have not been realised. The absence 
of a solid evidence base has not prevented policy makers from 
embracing incentives as a lever for change. It is important, therefore, 
to build knowledge of how and why schemes are implemented in 
practice, in order to inform future policy in this area. In particular, 
studies which go beyond a ‘black box’ approaches and a control/
resistance framework are urgently required.
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